See Tajiks and Afghans BBC Persian
REASONS FOR DECISION:
The complainant, an Afghan national, applied for international protection after illegally entering Austria on December 9, 2015.
In the first questioning held on December 10th, 2015 by an organ of the public security service, the complainant stated that he was born on XXXX in a specified place in the province of Kapisa, Afghanistan, that he speaks Dari as his mother tongue and Farsi and the ethnic group of the Tajiks as well to belong to the Muslim faith with a Sunni orientation. The first two years of the applicant's life were in Afghanistan, where he lived in his place of birth, and from the age of three he grew up in Iran, where he attended school from the age of ten. His father, mother, three brothers and a sister would live in a specified place in Iran. Regarding the reasons for leaving his country of origin, including his reasons for fleeing, the complainant stated that he had moved with his family to Iran as a small child, where he had lived in Afghanistan, he did not know. His parents are seriously ill, so they moved with the children from Afghanistan to Iran. There were financial problems in Iran, they had not received any documents in Iran, and they had been badly treated by the Iranians. Because there was no future for the complainant there, he decided to leave Iran. When asked what he feared if he returned to his home country, the applicant stated that he no longer had anyone in Afghanistan and that his family lived in Iran.
After the proceedings had been approved, the complainant was questioned in writing on 08.08.2017 by the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (BFA; hereinafter also referred to as the authority concerned) in the presence of an interpreter of the Farsi language. When asked about the reasons for leaving Afghanistan, the complainant stated the following:
I left my home country Afghanistan with my family when I was two years old. I can't even remember my home country Afghanistan. I left Iran in 2015 because we were staying there illegally and we had no documents. I couldn't officially work there either and only attend an Afghan school. The police kept sending Afghans back to Afghanistan and the Iranians were very bad to us.
LA: Are there any other reasons for fleeing or asylum that you want to assert?
VP: I came here to Austria because I want to have a better life. Life in Iran is not worth living.
LA: Have you yourself been exposed to a current and individual threat or persecution in your home country, Afghanistan, or were you specifically threatened?
LA: Were you personally threatened or persecuted in your home country Afghanistan on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a certain social group or political conviction? Have you suffered a fear of threat or persecution related to this?
VP: No, for these reasons I was neither threatened nor persecuted. I also suffered no fear of threat or persecution.
LA: Would you face persecution, inhuman treatment or the death penalty if you returned and deported your home country?
VP: I have no one in Afghanistan and I left when I was very young.
LA: Do you want to put forward any other reasons?
With the decision of the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum dated August 11, 2017, the complainant's application for international protection in accordance with Section 3 (1) in conjunction with Section 2 (1) no.13 AsylG regarding the granting of the status of person entitled to asylum (point I.) was rejected. On the other hand, the complainant's application regarding the granting of subsidiary protection status with regard to the country of origin Afghanistan was granted and the complainant was granted subsidiary protection status in accordance with Section 8 (1) AsylG (ruling point II.) And the complainant was granted a temporary residence permit until 11.08.2018 granted (point III.).
The authority concerned established that the complainant was a national of Afghanistan who belonged to the Muslim-Sunni faith and the Tajik ethnic group. A personal persecution or threat on grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a certain social group or political conviction or any other persecution could not be determined in relation to Afghanistan. In the event of a return to Afghanistan, however, at the time of the decision, the complainant, as a person who did not have a social network in the sense of a family association, would be in danger of falling into a hopeless situation and not finding a livelihood, which is why he should be granted subsidiary protection.
The complainant only brought against point I. of this decision of 11.08.2017, with which the complainant's application for international protection in accordance with Section 3 (1) in conjunction with Section 2 (1) no.13 AsylG regarding the granting of asylum status was rejected lodged a complaint in due time through his legal representation with a written submission dated September 1, 2017, in which essentially reference was made to the complainant's previous submissions that were asylum-relevant in the opinion of the complaint. This complaint also requested that an oral hearing be held before the Federal Administrative Court.
The Federal Administrative Court held a public hearing on March 20, 2019 in which the complainant was asked about the reasons for fleeing. The Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum decided not to hold or participate in a negotiation.
In the context of this oral hearing on March 20, 2019, when asked whether he wanted to add something to his previous submissions made in the context of the proceedings before the BFA and in the complaint, the complainant submitted, no, the reasons were the same. When asked whether he had current reasons to flee or whether he feared current persecution in Afghanistan, the complainant stated that his problem was that he did not know anyone in Afghanistan and that he did not know the country either. He was afraid, because he had spoken to many other refugees, that his residence permit in Austria was also very shaky. He could be told at any time that he had to go back to Afghanistan, he was afraid of that. The situation is comparable to his previous situation in Iran. That is also the main reason why he complained. The complainant did not comment on the country reports published with the summons.
II. The Federal Administrative Court - in the appeal procedure limited to the issue of granting the status of the person entitled to asylum (contested ruling point I. of the decision of 11.08.2017) - considered:
The applicant is a national of Afghanistan, belongs to the Tajik ethnic group and is a Muslim with a Sunni orientation. His identity is not certain. The applicant was born in Afghanistan in the Kapisa province, spent the first two years of his life there and subsequently grew up in Iran from the age of three.
It is established that the complainant has not brought forward any specific and targeted risk of persecution directed against himself in relation to his country of origin, Afghanistan.
As regards the situation in the country of origin, the following is stated:
On May 19, 2018, the Taliban declared that they would no longer attack members of the Afghan security forces if they left their troops, thus granting them an "amnesty". In their statement, the insurgents declared that the target of their spring offensive was America and their allies (AJ May 19, 2018).
On June 7, 2018, President Ashraf Ghani announced a ceasefire with the Taliban for the period June 12, 2018 to June 20, 2018. The declaration came after over 2,000 religious scholars from all over Afghanistan had gathered in Kabul on June 4, 2018 and issued a fatwa to end the violence (Tolonews 7 June 2018; see Reuters 7 June 2018, RFL / RL 5 June 2018). The fatwa declared suicide attacks illegal (according to Islamic law, note) and called on the Taliban to support the peace process (Reuters June 5, 2018). The Taliban themselves accepted the offer on 9.6.2018 and declared a three-day ceasefire (the first three days of the Eid festival, note). However, the ceasefire would not apply to the foreign security forces; The Taliban would also defend themselves in the event of a military attack (HDN June 10, 2018; see TH June 10, 2018, Tolonews June 9, 2018).
Because of a series of high-profile attacks in urban centers carried out by anti-government elements, the United Nations (UN) declared the security situation to be very unstable in February 2018 (UNGASC February 27, 2018).
In 2017, the non-governmental organization INSO (International NGO Safety Organization) registered 29,824 safety-related incidents nationwide. In a year-on-year comparison, INSO registered 28,838 security-related incidents nationwide in 2016 and 25,288 in 2015. Security incidents include INSO threats, assaults, direct fire, kidnappings, incidents with IEDs (booby traps / unconventional explosive devices or IEDs) and other types of incidents (INSO undated).
Afghanistan continues to face a foreign-backed and resilient insurgency. Nonetheless, the Afghan security forces have shown their determination and growing capabilities in the fight against the Taliban-led insurgency. The Afghan government retains control over Kabul, larger population centers, the most important transport routes and most of the district centers (USDOD 12.2017). Although the Taliban fought over district centers, they were unable to threaten any provincial capitals (except for Farah City; see AAN 6/6/2018) - a significant milestone for the ANDSF (USDOD 12/2017; see UNGASC 2/27/2018); Afghan and international security officials ascribed this milestone to the intensive air strikes by the Afghan national army and the air force as well as increased night raids by Afghan special forces (UNGASC February 27, 2018).
Attacks or attacks and attacks on high-level targets
The Taliban and other insurgent groups such as the Islamic State (IS) continued to carry out "high-profile" attacks, especially in the area of the capital, with the aim of gaining media coverage and thus creating a feeling of insecurity and thus the legitimacy of the undermine the Afghan government (USDOD 12.2017; see SBS 28.2.2018, NZZ 21.3.2018, UNGASC 27.2.2018). Insurgents may see attacks on the capital as an effective way to undermine popular trust in the government, rather than trying to capture and hold territory in rural areas (BBC 03/21/2018).
The number of high-profile attacks had increased from 1.6. - 20.11.2017 increased compared to the same period of the previous year (USDOD 12.2017). In the first months of 2018, attacks or attacks by the Taliban and IS increased in various parts of Kabul (AJ February 24, 2018; see Slate April 22, 2018). In response to the increasing attacks, air strikes and security operations have been stepped up, pushing back insurgents in some areas (BBC 03/21/2018); Special operations were also carried out in the capital, as well as efforts by the Americans to identify and localize terrorists (WSJ March 21, 2018).
An increase in the number of high-profile violent incidents was also registered (UNGASC February 27, 2018)
In August 2017 it was reported that anti-government armed groups - particularly the Taliban - had increased their activities across the country, despite pressure from the Afghan security forces and the international community to end their activities (Khaama Press 08/13/2017). The fighting with the Taliban has also escalated, as the uprising has shifted from the south to the otherwise peaceful north of the country, where the Taliban are also recruiting young people (Xinhua March 18, 2018). From 2008 the Taliban expanded in the north of the country. This new phase in their struggle history was the result of the government building and consolidation process in the southern regions of the country. In addition, the Taliban opened their ranks to non-Pashtun fighters mainly in Faryab and Sar-i-Pul, where the majority of the population is of Uzbek descent (AAN March 17, 2017).
Part of the new strategy of the government and international forces in the fight against the Taliban is to step up air strikes by Afghan and international forces in the areas most affected by incidents. These include the eastern and southern regions, where the majority of the incidents were registered. Another strategy used by the authorities to take action against the Taliban and the Haqqani network is to reduce their incomes by air strikes against their opium production (SIGAR 1.2018).
According to estimates by SIGAR, the Taliban controlled 14% of the districts of Afghanistan in October 2017 and January 2018 (SIGAR April 30, 2018). The Taliban themselves announced in March 2017 that they controlled almost 10% of the Afghan districts (ODI 6/2018). The Taliban continue to hold large territory in the northern and southern areas of Helmand Province (JD News March 12, 2018; see LWY April 20, 2018). The ANDSF, supported by US troops, gained ground in the first months of 2018, although the Taliban still keep half of Helmand province under control (JD News March 12, 2018; see LWJ April 20, 2018) . Helmand was a main battlefield for a long time - especially in the area around the Sangin district, which is considered to be the core of the Taliban uprising (JD News March 12, 2018; see Reuters March 30, 2018). The Taliban received unexpected pressure from their own stronghold in Helmand: Parallel to the Friendship Conference held in Uzbekistan at the end of March 2018, hundreds of people took to the streets, held a sit-in and swore to take a long march in the Taliban-controlled city To hold Musa Qala to call for peace talks. Among the protesting people were women who are seldom seen outside of the home in this conservative region of Afghanistan (NYT 3/27/2018).
The provincial capital of Kabul and also the capital of Afghanistan is Kabul City. The province of Kabul borders in the northwest with the province Parwan, in the northeast with Kapisa, in the east with Laghman, with Nangarhar in the southeast, with Logar in the south and with (Maidan) Wardak in the southwest. Kabul is connected to the provinces of Kandahar, Herat and Mazar by the so-called ring road and to Peshawar in Pakistan by the Kabul-Torkham motorway. The province of Kabul consists of the following units (Pajhwok oDz): Bagrami, Chaharasyab / Char Asiab, Dehsabz / Deh sabz, Estalef / Istalif, Farza, Guldara, Kabul city, Kalakan, Khak-e Jabbar / Khak-i-Jabar, Mirbachakot / Mir Bacha Kot, Musayi / Mussahi, Paghman, Qarabagh, Shakardara, Surobi / Sorubi (UN OCHA 4-2014; cf. Pajhwok oDz).
The province's population is estimated at 4,679,648 (CSO 4,2017).
Different ethnic groups live in the capital Kabul: Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluch, Sikhs and Hindus. A large part of the population belongs to the Sunni faith, but a number of Shiites, Sikhs and Hindus live next to each other in Kabul city (Pajhwok o.D.z). People from insecure provinces, looking for security and jobs, come to Kabul - for example to the Shuhada-e Saliheen region (LAT March 26, 2018). In the capital Kabul there are around 60 recognized informal settlements in which 65,000 registered returnees and IDPs live (TG 15.3.2018).
Kabul has an international airport: Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIR) (Tolonews February 25, 2018; see airport map in the state documentation; Chapter 3.35). The four-lane "Ring Road", which connects Kabul with the neighboring provinces, is also to be extended (Tolonews 9/10/2017; cf. Chapter 3.35.).
General information on the security situation
Once considered relatively safe, the capital Kabul has been hit by high-profile attacks by the Taliban (Reuters March 14, 2018) aimed at undermining the authority of the Afghan government (Reuters March 14, 2018; see UNGASC February 27, 2018). 2018). Armed groups hostile to the government, including IS, are attempting to carry out attacks in key provinces and districts, as well as in the capital Kabul (Khaama Press March 26, 2018; see FAZ April 22, 2018, AJ April 30, 2018).In 2017 and the first few months of 2018 there were several high-profile attacks in the city of Kabul; this revealed the vulnerability of the Afghan and foreign security forces (DW 27.3.2018; cf. VoA 19.3.2018 SCR 3.2018, FAZ 22.4.2018, AJ 30.4.2018).
In 2017, the highest number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan was recorded in Kabul province, mainly as a result of arbitrary attacks in the city of Kabul; 16% of all civilian casualties in Afghanistan are recorded in Kabul.
Suicide attacks and complex attacks, as well as other types of incidents in which IEDs were also used, increased the number of civilian casualties in Kabul. This high-profile attack in May 2017 was responsible for a third of civilian casualties in the city of Kabul in 2017 (UNAMA 2.2018).
Anti-government groups in Kabul province
Both the Taliban and the IS are carrying out high-profile attacks in the city of Kabul (UNGASC February 27, 2018; see RFE / RL March 17, 2018, Dawn January 31, 2018), and the Haqqani network is also said to have carried out attacks in perpetrated by the city of Kabul (RFE / RL January 30, 2018; see NYT March 9, 2018, VoA 1.6.2017). In the capital Kabul, for example, there seem to be an infrastructure, logistics and possibly also personnel ("terrorists to hire"), which are provided by the Haqqani network or other Taliban groups, splinter groups under the IS flag and Pakistani sectarian (anti - Shiite) groups are used (AAN 5.2.2018).
For example, between December 27, 2017 and January 29, 2018, eight attacks were carried out in three cities, including Jalalabad and Kandahar as well as Kabul - five of these attacks took place there. Nonetheless, the intensified attacks do not - yet - indicate any major change with regard to the Taliban's "modus operandi" (AAN 5.2.2018).
Herat is one of the largest provinces in Afghanistan and is located in the west of the country. Herat borders on Badghis and Turkmenistan Province to the north, Farah Province to the south, Ghor Province to the east and Iran to the west. The province is divided into the following districts, which at the same time also form the administrative units: Shindand, Engeel / Injil, Ghorian / Ghoryan, Guzra / Guzara and Pashtoon Zarghoon / Pashtun Zarghun, are regarded as districts of the first level. Awba / Obe, Kurkh / Karukh, Kushk, Gulran, Kuhsan / Kohsan, Zinda Jan and Adraskan as districts of the second level and Kushk-i-Kuhna / Kushki Kohna, Farsi, and Chisht-i-Sharif / Chishti Sharif as districts of the third level ( UN OCHA 4.2014; see Pajhwok o. D.). The provincial capital is Herat City, which is located in the district of the same name and has a population of 506,900 (CP 21.9.2017). There are two airports in the province: an international one in Herat City and a military one in Shindand (see airport map in the state documentation; Chapter 3.35.). The population of the province is estimated at 1,967,180 (CSO 4,2017).
Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara, Turkmen, Uzbeken and Aimaken live in the province (Pajhwok, n.d.; see NPS, n.d.).
Herat is a relatively developed province in the west of the country. The Harirud Valley, one of the most fertile valleys in the country, where cotton, fruit and oilseeds are grown, is located in the province (AJ 8.3.2012). Herat is also known for its pioneering role in saffron production (AJ March 8, 2012; see EN November 9, 2017). Government programs and foreign programs to support saffron production are to be implemented. Saffron is to become an alternative to poppy cultivation (Tolonews 11/10/2017; see EN 11/9/2017). At the beginning of January 2018 a laboratory to control the saffron quality was built in Herat (Pajhwok 13.1.2018). Saffron production also guaranteed numerous jobs for women in the province (Tolonews 11/10/2017; see EN 11/11/2017). Saffron is also grown in unsafe areas. (Tolonews 11/10/2017). A total of at least 8 tons of saffron were produced in the province in 2017; in the previous year 2016 it was 6.5 tons (Pajhwok 13.1.2018; see EN 9.11.2017). Despite this, opium production increased in the province in 2017. Poppy cultivation was highest in the Shindand and Kushk districts, characterized by a poor security situation (UNODC 11.2017).
Various agreements were signed with Uzbekistan in December 2017. One of these concerns the construction of a 400 km long railway line from Mazar-e Sharif and Maymana to Herat (UNGASC February 27, 2018; see RFE / RL December 6, 2017).
The construction of the TAPI line in Afghanistan was inaugurated in mid-March 2018. This is a 1,800 km long pipeline for natural gas, which will supply Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India with 33 trillion m³ of Turkmen natural gas for 30 years. The planned line will extend along the Herat-Kandahar highway. So it will run through areas over which the Taliban have a strong influence. However, the Taliban declared that TAPI was an "important project" and that they would support it (PPG 02/26/2018; cf. RFE / RL 02/23/2018). As part of the TAPI project, 70 Taliban have agreed to take part in the peace process (Tolonews March 4th, 2018). To ensure security for the implementation of the TAPI project, thousands of security guards were deployed (Tolonews March 14, 2018).
General information on the security situation
Herat is rated as one of the relatively peaceful provinces, but insurgents are active in some districts of the province, such as Shindand, Kushk, Chisht-i-Sharif and Gulran (AN February 18, 2018; see UNODC 12.2017, Khaama Press October 25, 2017, AJ June 25, 2017). Furthermore, it was announced at the end of October 2017 that the province of Herat is one of the relatively quiet provinces in the west of the country, although the situation in the remote districts has deteriorated in recent years due to the Taliban (Khaama Press October 25, 2017).
The province is known to have a main corridor for people smuggling into Iran - especially of children (Pajhwok January 21, 2017).
In mid-February 2018, the Halo Trust demining organization announced that after ten years of demining, 14 out of 16 districts in the province were safe. There is no longer any risk of landmines and other duds in these areas, said the provincial governor's spokesman. Due to the poor security situation and the presence of insurgents, the districts of Gulran and Shindand have not yet been cleared of mines. Thousands of Afghan internally displaced persons live in the province (AN February 18, 2018).
In the period January 1, 2017 to April 30, 2018, 139 security incidents were registered in the province. For all of 2017, 495 civilian casualties (238 civilians killed and 257 injured) were recorded in Herat province. IEDs were the main cause, followed by suicide / complex attacks and targeted killings. This means an increase of 37% compared to the comparison year 2016 (UNAMA 2.2018).
Military operations in Herat
Military operations are being carried out in the province to free some areas from insurgents (Khaama Press January 18, 2017; Khaama Press January 15, 2017). Air strikes are also carried out (D&S October 25, 2017; see NYT August 29, 2017); Taliban were killed in the process (D&S October 25, 2017; see NYT August 29, 2017). Clashes between security forces and insurgents take place (AJ June 25, 2017; see AAN January 11, 2017). Troops of the Italian army are stationed in Herat and support Afghan armed forces in eastern Afghanistan under the Train Advise Assist Command West (TAAC-W) (MdD, undated).
Anti-government groups in Herat
Herat is rated as one of the relatively peaceful provinces, but insurgents are active in some districts of the province, such as Shindand, Kushk, Chisht-i-Sharif and Gulran (AN February 18, 2018;
see UNODC 12.2017, Khaama Press 25.10.2017, AJ 25.6.2017). Iran is said by various sources to train and finance Afghan Taliban fighters (RFE / RL 23.2.2018;
see Gandhara February 22, 2018, IP August 13, 2017, NYT August 5, 2017). Anti-government insurgents attacked holy places such as Shiite mosques in capitals such as Kabul and Herat in mid-2017 (FAZ 1.8.2017; cf. DW 1.8.2017). Nevertheless, Taliban insurgents declared their readiness to support the TAPI project and to participate in the peace process (AF March 14, 2018; see Tolonews March 4, 2018). There were internal conflicts between hostile Taliban groups (D&S October 25, 2017; see NYT August 29, 2017).
Supporters of ISIS declared themselves responsible for the first time in Herat for attacks that took place outside the provinces of Nangarhar and Kabul (UNAMA 2.2018).
ACLED registered IS-related incidents (violence against the civilian population) in the province of Herat for the period January 1, 2017 to July 15, 2017 (ACLED February 23, 2017).
-ACLED - Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project - Islamic State in Afghanistan,
https://www.acleddata.com/2018/02/23/islamic-state-in-afghanistan/ accessed on March 19, 2018
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-AJ - Al Jazeera (June 25, 2017): Taliban attack targets police in Afghanistan's Herat,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/taliban-attack-targets-police-afghanistan-herat-170625102845231.html, accessed on March 19, 2018
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Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2017-2018, http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%20%D9%86%D9 % 81% D9% 88% D8% B3 / Final% 20Population% 201396.pdf, accessed on May 4, 2018
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-DW - Deutsche Welle (August 1, 2017): Attack on mosque in Herat, http://www.dw.com/de/anschlag-auf-moschee-in-herat/a-39926343, accessed March 19, 2018
-EASO - European Asylum Support Office (12.2017): EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan Security Situation, .BFA Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum Page 110 of 344
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/EASO_Afghanistan_security_situation_2017.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,-468,842, accessed on March 19, 2018
-EN - Euronews (9.11.2017): Afghanistan: Saffron soon as an alternative to poppy seed cultivation,
http://de.euronews.com/2017/11/09/afghanistan-safran-bald-alternative-zum-mohn-anbau, accessed on March 16, 2018
-FAZ - Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1.8.2017): At least 50 dead in attack in Afghanistan,
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/herat-mindest-50-tote-bei-anschlag-in-afghanistan-15132606.html, accessed on March 19, 2018
-Gandhara (February 22, 2018): Afghan Militants "Trained In Iran" Surrender Before TAPI Attack,
https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/Afghanistan-herat-tapi-Iran/29056883.html, accessed on March 19, 2018
-IP - Il Post (13.8.2017): L'Iran si sta facendo largo in Afghanistan,
https://www.ilpost.it/2017/08/13/iran-talebani-afghanistan/, accessed on March 19, 2018
-Khaama Press (25.10.2017): Airstrike target a gathering of 300 Taliban militants in Herat,
https://www.khaama.com/airstrike-target-a-gathering-of-300-taliban-militants-in-herat-03710/, accessed on March 19, 2018
-MdD - Ministero della Difesa (undated): Contributo nazionale, https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_intern_corso/AfghanistanRS/Pagine/Contributonazionale.aspx, accessed March 19, 2018
-NPS - Naval Postgraduate School (undated): Herat Provincial Overview, https://my.nps.edu/web/ccs/herat, accessed March 19, 2018
-NYT - New York Times (August 29, 2017): Airstrikes in Afghanistan Kill More Than a Dozen Civilians,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/29/world/asia/afghanistan-airstrikes-civilians.html, accessed on March 19, 2018
-NYT - New York Times (5.8.2017): In Afghanistan, U.S. Exists, and Iran Comes In,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/05/world/asia/iran-afghanistan-taliban.html, accessed on March 19, 2018
-Pajhwok (13.1.2018): First-ever saffron quality control lab opens in Herat,
https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/01/13/first-ever-saffron-quality-control-lab-opens-herat, accessed on March 16, 2018
-Pajhwok (January 21, 2017): Wounded souls of deported Afghan children, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2017/01/21/wounded-souls-deported-afghan-children, accessed March 19, 2018
-Pajhwok (undated): Background profile of Herat Province, http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-herat-province-1, accessed March 16, 2018
-PPG - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (February 26, 2018): Leaders of Afghanistan and Pakistan have inaugurated the long-awaited TAPI gas pipeline, http://www.post-gazette.com/powersource/policy-powersource/2018/02/ 25 / Leaders-of-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan-have-inaugurated-the-long-awaited-TAPI-gas-pipeline / stories / 201802250212, accessed on March 19, 2018
-RFE / RL - Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (23.2.2018): Leaders Mark Start Of Work On Afghan Section Of TAPI Pipeline, https://www.rferl.org/a/tapi-pipeline-afghanistan-pakistan-turkmenistan- india-taliban-herat / 29058473.html, accessed on March 19, 2018
-RFE / RL - Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (December 6th, 2017): Uzbekistan, Seeking Sea Access, Signs Railway Deal With Afghanistan, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-seeaking-sea-access-signs- railway-deal-afghanistan-hairatan-mazar-e-sharif / 28899419.html, accessed on 19.3.2018
-Tolonews (March 14, 2018): Seven Die In Kandahar-Herat Highway Accident, https://www.tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/seven-die-kandahar-herat-highway-accident, accessed March 19, 2018. BFA Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum Page 111 of 344
-Tolonews (March 4th, 2018): Taliban Group Ready To Join Peace Process, https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/taliban-group-ready-join-peace-process, accessed March 19, 2018
-Tolonews (11/10/2017): Saffron Production Makes Dramatic Increase in Herat,
https://www.tolonews.com/business/saffron-production-makes-dramatic-increase-herat, accessed on March 16, 2018
-UNAMA - United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (2.2018):
Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict - Annual Report 2017,
https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/15_february_2018_-_afghanistan_civilian_casualties_in_2017_-_un_report_english_0.pdf, accessed March 19, 2018
-UNGASC - United Nations General Assembly Security Council (February 27, 2018): The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on_afghanistan_27_february.pdf, accessed March 19 .2018
-UN OCHA - United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (4.2014): Hirat Province, District Atlas, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Hirat.pdf, accessed 16.3. 2018
-UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (11.2017):
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Afghan_opium_survey_2017_cult_prod_web.pdf, accessed March 16, 2018
Balkh Province is located in northern Afghanistan; From a geostrategic point of view, it is an important province
and known as a center for economic and political activity. She has the following
administrative units: Hairatan Port, Nahra-i-Shahi, Dihdadi, Balkh, Daulatabad, Chamtal,
Sholgar, Chaharbolak, Kashanda, Zari, Charkont, Shortipa, Kaldar, Marmal, and Khalm; the
The provincial capital is Mazar-e Sharif. The province borders Tajikistan and to the north
Uzbekistan. Samangan Province is both east and south of Balkh. The provinces Kunduz and Samangan are in the east, Jawzjan in the west and Sar-e Pul in the south (Pajhwok o.D.y).
Balkh borders three Central Asian states: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan (RFE / RL 9.2015). The population of the province is estimated at 1,382,155
The capital Mazar-e Sharif is located on the highway between Maimana [note: provincial capital Faryab] and Pul-e-Khumri [note:
Provincial capital Baghlan]; it is also an economic and transport hub in northern Afghanistan. The region is developing well economically. New jobs are being created, companies are settling here and the service sector is also growing.
However, the infrastructure is still inadequate and hinders the further development of the region. Many of the roads, especially in the mountainous parts of the country, are in poor condition, difficult to drive and often impassable in winter (BFA State Documentation 4.2018).
There is an international airport in Mazar-e Sharif (see airport map of
State documentation; Chapter 3.35).
In June 2017, a large national project was launched which aims to reduce poverty and unemployment in Balkh Province (Pajhwok 7.6.2017).
After months of discussions, at the end of March 2018, the former governor of the province
Balkh Atta Noor accepted his resignation and ended a stalemate with President Ghani. He appointed the MP Mohammad Ishaq Rahgozar as his successor as provincial governor (RFE / RL 23.3.2018; see Reuters 22.3.2018). The new governor promised to fight corruption and guarantee security in the north of the country (Tolonews March 24, 2018).
General information on the security situation
The province of Balkh is still one of the most stable provinces in Afghanistan (RFE / RL 23.3.2018), it is one of the relatively quiet provinces in northern Afghanistan (Khaama Press 16.1.2018; see Khaama Press 20.8.2017). Balkh has seen less insurgent activity compared to other regions (RFE / RL 23.3.2018; see Khaama Press 16.1.2018).
Sometimes there are clashes between insurgents and the Afghan insurgents
Security forces (Tolonews 7.3.2018), or attacks on facilities of the
Security forces (BBC April 22, 2017; see BBC June 17, 2017).
Camp Marmal, run by the German Armed Forces, is located in the province
(TAAC-North: Train, Advise, Assist Command - North) (NATO 11.11.2016; see iHLS 28.3.2018),
as well as Camp Shaheen (BBC June 17, 2017; see Tolonews April 22, 2017).
Between January 1, 2017 and April 30, 2018, 93 security-related incidents were registered in the province.
In all of 2017, 129 civilian casualties (52 civilians killed and 77 injured) were recorded.
IEDs were the main cause, followed by ground offensives and duds / landmines. This
means a decrease of 68% compared to the reference year 2016 (UNAMA 2.2018).
Military operations in Balkh
The Afghan defense and security forces regularly conduct military operations to displace anti-government insurgents and prevent them from gaining a foothold in the north of the country (Khaama Press January 16, 2018). These military operations are carried out in certain areas of the province (Tolonews March 18, 2018; see PT.3.2018, Pajhwok August 21, 2017, Pajhwok July 10, 2017). The Taliban are killed (Tolonews March 18, 2018; see PT March 6, 2018, Pajhwok July 10, 2017) and sometimes their leaders (Tolonews March 18, 2018; see Tolonews March 7, 2018, PT March 6, 2018, Tolonews April 22, 2017) .
Clashes between insurgents and security forces take place (Tolonews
Anti-government groups in Balkh
Anti-government groups are attempting an uprising in Balkh Province
(Khaama Press January 16, 2018). Both Taliban insurgents and
IS sympathizers are trying to gain a foothold in remote districts of the province (Khaama Press 08/20/2017).
No IS-related incidents were recorded in the province between January 1, 2017 and July 15, 2017.
In the period from July 16, 2017 to January 31, 2018, incidents caused by the IS occurred along the
Border from Balkh to Sar-e Pul registered (ACLED 23.2.2018).
ACLED - Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (23.2.2018):
Islamic State in
BBC (June 17, 2017): Afghan soldier attacks US troops at Camp Sheheen,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40314612, accessed on March 28, 2018
BBC (April 22, 2017): Afghan casualties in Taliban Mazar-e Sharif attack pass 100,
h ttp: //www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39672357, accessed on March 28, 2018
BFA State Documentation (4.2018): FFM report Afghanistan,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1430912.html, accessed on May 7, 2018
CSO - Central Statistics Organization (CSO) Afghanistan (4.2017):
Estimated population of
% D9% 86% 20% D9% 86% D9% 81% D9% 88% D8% B3 / Final% 20Population% 201396.pdf, access
EASO - European Asylum Support Office (12.2016): EASO Country of Origin Information
Report Afghanistan Security Situation,
7. pdf # page = 1 & zoom = auto, -468,842, accessed on 9 March 2018
iHLS - Israel's Home Land Security (March 28, 2018): 3D Printer to Produce Military Spare Parts On
Site, https://i-hls.com/archives/82228, accessed on March 28, 2018
Khaama Press (January 16, 2018): Clashes in Balkh province leaves over 20 militants dead, wounded,
04273 /, accessed on March 29, 2018
Khaama Press (August 20, 2017): Taliban rejects Ata Mohammad Noor's claims during Balkh
operations-03394 /, accessed on March 28, 2018
Pajhwok (August 21, 2017): Balkh's Chamtal district cleaned up from rebels,
Accessed March 28, 2018
Pajhwok (July 10, 2017): 60 rebels killed, 100 wounded in Balkh, Jawzjan operations,
Accessed March 28, 2018
Pajhwok (7.6.2017): Poverty alleviation project launched in Balkh,
Pajhwok (undated y): Background Profile of Balkh,
http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/background-profile-balkh, accessed on March 28, 2018
PT - Pakistan Today (6.3.2018): Taliban key commander among 4 killed in Afghan northern
4-killed-in-afghan-northern-balkh-province /, accessed on March 28, 2018
Reuters (March 22, 2018): Powerful Afghan governor defying President Ghani agrees to go,
ghani-agrees-to-go-idUSKBN1GY1PU, accessed on March 28, 2018
RFE / RL - Radio Free Europe / Radio Free Liberty (23.3.2018):
Powerful Afghan Governor
Resigns, Ending Standoff With Ghani, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/afghanistan-powerfulgovernor-
resigns-noor-ghani / 29116004.html, accessed on March 28, 2018
RFE / RL - Radio Free Europe / Radio Free Liberty (9.2015):
Afghanistan's New Northern Flash
Tolonews (March 24, 2018): New Balkh Governor Vows To Fight Corruption, Ensure Security,
Accessed March 28, 2018
Tolonews (March 18, 2018): Dozens Of Insurgents Killed In ANSF Operations,
Accessed March 28, 2018
Tolonews (7.3.2018): Taliban Local Commander Killed In Balkh Clash,
Tolonews (April 22, 2017): 209 Shaheen Corps: The Base The Taliban Attacked,
UNAMA - United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (2.2018):
of Civilians in Armed Conflict - Annual Report 2017,
_afghanistan_civilian_casualties_in_2017 _-_ un_report_english_0.pdf, accessed on 1.3.2018
UN OCHA (4.2014): Balkh Province District Atlas, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/
www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/Balkh.pdf, accessed on March 9, 2018
According to estimates from July 2017, more than 34.1 million people live in Afghanistan (CIA Factbook January 18, 2018). Reliable statistical information on the ethnic groups of Afghanistan and the various languages does not exist (BFA State Documentation 7.2016; see CIA Factbook 18.1.2018). According to estimates, 40% are Pashtuns, around 30% Tajiks, around 10% Hazara and 9% Uzbeks. There are also other ethnic minorities, such as the Aimaken, who are an amalgamation of four semi-nomadic tribes of Mongolian and Iranian descent, as well as the Baluch, who together make up around 4% of the population (GIZ 1.2018; see CIA Factbook 18.1.2018 ).
Article 4 of the Constitution of Afghanistan states: "The nation of Afghanistan consists of the peoples of the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluch, Paschai, Nuristani, Aimaq, Arabs, Kyrgyz, Qizilbash, Gojar, Brahui and other peoples. Afghan 'is used for any citizen of the nation of Afghanistan ". (BFA State Documentation 7.2016). The Afghan constitution protects all ethnic minorities. In addition to the official national languages Dari and Pashto, the constitution (Art. 16) grants official status to six other languages in those areas where the majority of the population (also) speaks one of these languages: Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch, Pashai, Nuristani and Pamiri (AA 5.2018; see MPI January 27, 2004). There is no evidence that certain social groups are excluded. No laws prevent minorities from participating in political life. Nonetheless, different ethnic groups complain that they do not have access to government employment in provinces where they are a minority (USDOS April 20, 2018).
The principle of equality is legally anchored in the Afghan constitution, but is repeatedly contradicted in social practice. Social discrimination and the exclusion of other ethnic groups and religions in everyday life persist and are not reliably prevented by government countermeasures (AA 5.2018). Ethnic tensions between different groups continued to result in conflicts and killings (USDOS April 20, 2018).
The Dari-speaking minority of the Tajiks is the second largest (CRS 12/1/2015; see LIP 5/2018) and the second most powerful community in Afghanistan (CRS 12/1/2015). They make up about 30% of Afghan society (LIP 5.2018). Outside the Tajik core areas in northern Afghanistan, Tajiks form ethnic islands in large parts of Afghanistan, especially in the larger cities:
In the capital Kabul they are just in the majority (LIP 5.2018). From a historical perspective, speakers of Dari-Persian in Afghanistan identified themselves according to very different criteria, such as settlement area or region of origin. Accordingly, they called themselves käboli (from Kabul), heräti (from Herat), mazäri (from Mazar-e Sharif), panjsheri (from Pajshir) or badakhshi (from Badakhshan). They could also be named after their way of life. The name tajik (Tajike) traditionally referred to sedentary Persian-speaking farmers or city dwellers of Sunni denomination (BFA State Documentation 7.2016).
The main leader of the "Northern Alliance", a politico-military coalition, is Dr. Abdullah Abdullah - whose mother is Tajikin and whose father is Pashtune (CRS 12/1/2015). Despite his mixed race, people consider him a Tajik (BBC 9/29/2014). From a political point of view, he also identifies himself as a Tajike, as he was a high-ranking advisor to Ahmad Shah Masoud (CRS January 12, 2015). In the meantime he is "Chief Executive Officer" in Afghanistan (CRS 12.1.2015); an office specially created to give him the role of Prime Minister (BBC 02/29/2014).
The Tajiks are represented on a national average with around 25% in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) (Brookings May 25, 2017).
Freedom of movement
The law guarantees internal freedom of movement, foreign travel, emigration and return, the government occasionally restricts the movement of citizens for security reasons [Note: see also Article 39 of the Afghan Constitution] (USDOS April 13, 2016; cf. Max Planck Institute 27.1 .2004).
In some parts of the country, a lack of security is the greatest limitation of movement. In some areas, insurgent violence, landmines and improvised booby traps (IEDs) make traveling particularly dangerous, especially at night. Armed insurgent groups operate illegal checkpoints and extort money and goods. The Taliban are imposing night curfews in those regions in which they have control - most of them in the southeast (USDOS April 13, 2016).
Max Planck Institute (January 27, 2004): The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,
http://www.mpipriv.de/files/pdf4/verfassungs_2004_deutsch_mpil_webseite.pdf, accessed on December 29, 2016
USDOS - US Department of State (April 13, 2016): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2015 - Afghanistan, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper, accessed January 17 .2017
There is no obligation to report in Afghanistan (DIS 5.2012; see also: DW 9.10.2004).
DIS - Danish Immigration Service (5.2012): Afghanistan Country of Origin Information for Use in the Asylum Determination Process, http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/3FD55632-770B-48B6-935C-827E83C18AD8/0/FFMrapportenAFGHANISTAN2012Final. pdf, accessed on November 29, 2016
DW - Deutsche Welle (October 9, 2004): Call for boycott overshadows election in Afghanistan,
http://www.dw.com/de/boykott-aufruf-%C3%BCberschaturated-wahl-in-afghanistan/a-1354509, accessed on November 29, 2016
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees
According to a report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), returning refugees are complicating the situation of the already more than one million internally displaced persons, who have increased in number as a result of the uprising in 2016. In the opinion of the IMF, this will overwhelm the country's capacities (DAWN January 28, 2017).
The number of internally displaced persons in 2017 was 9,759 (as of February 4, 2017) (UN OCHA February 5, 2017). A total of 636,503 people were displaced due to the conflict in 2016 (UN OCHA January 29, 2017). More than half of these people (56%) were children under the age of 18. 31 provinces were affected by internal displacement to varying degrees; all 34 provinces hosted internally displaced persons. In 2016, most of the IDPs were from Kunduz, Uruzgan, Farah and Helmand provinces. At the same time, the provinces of Helmand, Takhar, Farah, Kunduz and Kandahar took in most of the internally displaced persons. So many people seek refuge near their home. Internally displaced persons tend to move from rural areas to the provincial capitals or to the neighboring provinces. As soon as the conflict is over, they try to return home soon (AAN 12/28/2016).
The most fateful month was October, in which the Taliban attacked several provincial capitals at the same time: Kunduz City, Farah City, Maimana, and Lashkar Gah. The rise in IDP numbers is also due to the withdrawal of international troops who assisted through air strikes; In the meantime, the Taliban have changed their attack tactics and have switched to ground offensives. Ground offensives are not only the cause of deaths and injuries among the civilian population, but also force people to flee their homes (AAN December 28, 2016).
In the context of humanitarian aid, internally displaced persons were supported in different ways, depending on the region and weather conditions: cash, packages for families, winter equipment, food packages, hygiene packages, blankets, tents, and other packages that did not contain any food, etc. There was also education in areas such as Hygiene operated (UN OCHA February 5, 2017; see also: UN OCHA January 29, 2017; UN OCHA November 1, 2016; UN OCHA October 1, 2016; see ACBAR November 7, 2016).
Different organizations, such as the International Red Cross (IRC) or the World Food Program (WFP) etc. are responsible for the distribution of goods depending on their areas of responsibility.
These included: food, tents and other goods that were not food (IOM April 17, 2016; see also ACBAR May 15, 2016).
UNHCR supports returnees with financial aid in four cash dispensing centers, as well as transit facilities and basic health services. In addition, they were informed in other areas, such as school enrollment, dangers of mines, etc. (UNHCR 6/2016).
Since January 2016, more than 700,000 unregistered Afghans have returned to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan (Thomson Reuters Foundation January 12, 2017); many of them have returned to Afghanistan mainly from Pakistan, Iran, Europe and other regions, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Many Afghans who have lived abroad for decades return to a country and are exposed to conflict, insecurity and widespread poverty. Due to difficult economic conditions, returnees are generally poor. Even if there are richer returnees, a typical returning refugee risks sliding into poverty (RFL / RE January 28, 2017). Most returnees (60%) decided - according to UNHCR - to settle in the urban areas of Kabul, Nangarhar and Kunduz (UNHCR 6/2016).
IOM announced an increase of 50,000 returnees compared to the previous year. UNHCR officially returned 372,577 registered Afghans to their homeland in 2016. According to UNHCR and IOM, the majority of returnees were young men from Iran who were looking for work or on their way to Europe (Thomson Reuters Foundation January 12, 2017). The Minister for Refugees and Repatriation even spoke of a million refugees who returned to Afghanistan in the last year - of which over 900,000 returned voluntarily (Khaama Press January 17, 2017).
Afghan returnees, Afghan refugees and unregistered Afghans
Pakistan has hosted no less than a million Afghans since 1978. Between 1986 and 1991 there were about three million refugees in Pakistan. Between 2002 and 2015 UNHCR supported 3.9 million Afghans returning. The majority of them returned by the end of 2008, after which the return rate fell significantly (HRW February 13, 2017).
Due to increasing tensions between the Afghan and Pakistani governments (Die Zeit February 13, 2017), were in 2016
249,832 Afghans returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan either voluntarily or by deportation (as of 7.1.2017) (IOM 8.1.2017).
Another half a million Afghans are expected to return from Pakistan by the end of 2017. The number of returnees has risen steadily over the past two years (DAWN January 12, 2017). In the first week of January 2017, 1,643 unregistered Afghans returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan (either voluntarily or as part of deportations) (IOM 8.1.2017). In the second week of January a total of 1,579 unregistered Afghans returned via Nangarhar and Kandahar, either voluntarily or in the course of deportations. IOM supported 79% of unregistered Afghans during the reporting period; this included food and accommodation in transit centers near the border, as well as household items and other items for families, special assistance for those with special needs, a one-month ration from the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) and other relevant hygiene items. In a survey at the end of 2016, 76% said they chose Nangarhar as the province of settlement, for 16% it was Kabul, for 4% it was Laghman, 2% went to Kunar and a further 2% went to Logar (IOM January 15, 2017).
In February 2017, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report that spoke of "forced returns" of Afghan refugees (HRW February 13, 2017). The HRW report is based on 115 interviews with Afghan returnees to Afghanistan, as well as Afghan refugees and unregistered Afghans in Pakistan (DAWN February 13, 2017; see also: HRW February 13, 2017). In June 2016 UNHCR increased the financial support for each returnees from US $ 200 to US $ 400 (HRW February 13, 2017). HRW argues that this is one factor that drove Afghan refugees to return to Afghanistan. According to the UNHCR, 4,500 returnees were interviewed on arrival, none of whom stated the cash allowance as the primary factor in the return decision (DAWN 02/13/2017). Reasons given for return include: establishment of formal border control in Torkham; great concern about the validity of the Proof of Registration Card (PoR-Cards); Campaign of the Afghan government in Pakistan ("home sweet home"), which asked Afghans to return home (UNHCR 3.2.2017).
Since January 1, 2016, a total of 461,112 unregistered Afghans have returned to Afghanistan from Iran. In the second week of January 2017, a total of 9,378 unregistered Afghans returned to Afghanistan through Herat or Nimroz; Of these, 3,531 returned voluntarily and 5,847 returned in the course of deportations - 2% of the unregistered Afghans who arrived at the transit centers in Herat or Nimroz were supported by IOM. This included 101 UMF (Unaccompanied Minor Refugees) to whom IOM provided special support, including medical treatment, safe accommodation and the search for family members (IOM January 15, 2017).
A UNHCR official reported that Afghan refugees were returning to areas where peace had been restored. Nevertheless, it is difficult to distribute all Afghan refugees in a year, since Iran sends back Afghan migrants and Afghanistan has a number of homeless people, which further complicates the situation (Pakistan Observer 02/02/2017). The IOM transit centers near the border offer basic accommodation, protection for unaccompanied minors, household items (pots and pans), as well as transport options for families in order to be able to settle in their desired areas (DAWN 12.1.2017).
Support from various on-site organizations
An increasing number of institutions offer microfinance services. The prerequisites for this differ, whereby the focus is mostly on the situation / risk of the applicant and the sustainability of the project. Returnees, and women in particular, receive regular support through microfinance services. However, the interest rates are usually comparatively high (IOM 2016).
The United Nations World Food Program (WFP) has launched a nine-month operation in Afghanistan to support the growing numbers of Pakistani returnees and internally displaced persons by providing them with emergency food and other resources:
Both the WFP and other UN agencies are working closely with the Afghan government to strengthen the humanitarian aid capacity, provide rapid accommodation, and meet hygiene and food needs. The organization provides food and financial aid to 163,000 unregistered returnees, 200,000 documented returnees and 150,000 internally displaced persons and refugees; 35,000 refugees in the provinces of Khost and Paktika were also supported. The WAFP has stepped up its support in eastern Afghanistan - to prevent malnutrition; the WFP supported more than 23,000 small children from returnees. The aim of the WFP is to help 550,000 people through emergency organizations (UN News Center November 15, 2016).
Some countries also work closely with IOM in Afghanistan as part of the Assisted Voluntary Return program - in particular to facilitate reintegration. IOM offers counseling and psychological support in the host country, support with travel formalities, arrival in Kabul and support during reintegration, including support in finding employment or granting a kick-off loan. Although IOM does not support deportations and does not carry out any deportation programs, IOM also provides support for deported asylum seekers after they have arrived in the country (AA 9.2016). With the exception of IOM, there are no other organizations that offer support for the reintegration of returnees in Afghanistan (IOM 2016).
Support from non-governmental organizations
According to UNHCR, Afghan UMFs are generally male unaccompanied children between the ages of 13 and 17 who undertake such a journey - they are motivated for various reasons. These related factors include poverty, insecurity, inadequate educational and work opportunities, and expectations of family and peer group. Both from areas with a low number of posted children and from areas with a high number of posted children, European countries were typically the desired destination. Iran was partially chosen as a stopover because family members and relatives living there could help to find work. The main departure points were Herat, Islam Qala [note: in the west of Herat] and Nimroz. It is common knowledge that smuggling networks are used for this trip (UNHCR 12.2014).
2. Evidence assessment:
Regarding the findings regarding the complainant's person:
The findings on the nationality of the complainant and on his religious and ethnic group affiliation result from his own pertinent information before the authority concerned; In the complaint, too, no deviating information is given in this regard. The Federal Administrative Court sees no sufficient reason to doubt these statements of the complainant - which have remained essentially the same throughout the entire proceedings. However, since the identity claimed by the complainant has not been proven by the corresponding original documents which are considered to be proof of identity, it has not been established. The Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum has already made corresponding findings.
The finding that the complainant did not put forward any specific and targeted risk of persecution directed against him in relation to his country of origin Afghanistan is based on the information provided by the complainant in the proceedings before the authority concerned, in the complaint and in the oral hearing before the Federal Administrative Court on March 20, 2019, which does not contain the allegation of individual acts of persecution directed against him or any other specific threats by state organs or private individuals with regard to Afghanistan. The complainant did not make a sufficiently substantiated and individualized persecution allegation directed against himself in the entire proceedings and was therefore not able to credibly demonstrate a specific and targeted persecution directed against himself and such is not evident ex officio.
Regarding the findings on the situation in the country of origin:
The findings on the relevant situation in Afghanistan in the present context are based on the relevant excerpts from the country information sheet dated June 29, 2018 in the updated version dated March 1, 2019. Since these are based on a large number of different, independent sources from governmental and non-governmental bodies and yet present a consistent overall picture in the core statements without significant contradictions, in the present case there is no reason for the Federal Administrative Court to doubt the correctness of the state determinations made. The findings on the situation in Afghanistan were made known to the complainant by way of his legal representation together with the summons to the oral hearing and are reproduced in the present knowledge in a form reduced to the parts that are relevant to the decision.
At the oral hearing on March 20, 2019, the complainant was given the opportunity to comment on the country information sheet of the state documentation introduced into the proceedings. Neither the complainant nor his legal representative commented on this.
To A) Rejection of the complaint
Pursuant to Section 3 (1) AsylG 2005, an alien who has submitted an application for international protection in Austria, unless this application has already been rejected in accordance with Sections 4, 4a or 5, is granted the status of person entitled to asylum if it is credible that He is threatened with persecution in the country of origin within the meaning of Art. 1 Section AZ 2 of the Geneva Refugee Convention.
According to Art. 1 Section AZ 2 of the Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees, Federal Law Gazette No. 55/1955, in the version of the Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees, Federal Law Gazette No. 78/1974, a refugee is someone who is out of well-founded fear , to be persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a certain social group or political conviction, is located outside his home country and is unable or in view of this fear unwilling to avail himself of the protection of this country or who is stateless, is outside the country of his habitual residence as a result of the above circumstances and is unable or unwilling to return to this country in view of this fear.
According to Section 3 (2) AsylG 2005, as amended, persecution can also be based on events that occurred after the alien left his country of origin (objective reasons for after-flight) or on activities of the alien that he or she has undertaken since leaving the country of origin, in particular Are the expression and continuation of a conviction that already exists in the country of origin (subjective reasons for after-flight). As a rule, an alien who makes a follow-up application (Section 2, Paragraph 1, Item 23) is not granted the status of person entitled to asylum if the risk of persecution is based on circumstances that the alien created himself after leaving his country of origin, unless These are activities permitted in Austria that are demonstrably the expression and continuation of a conviction that already exists in the country of origin.
The central element of the term refugee is the "well-founded fear of persecution". A well-founded fear of persecution exists when, objectively, a person has reason to fear persecution in the individual situation of the asylum seeker. A "risk of persecution" is required, whereby persecution is to be understood as an interference of considerable intensity in the sphere of the individual to be protected by the state, which is capable of reducing the unreasonableness of claiming the protection of the home state or returning to the country of the previous stay to justify. The risk of persecution must be due to the reasons stated in the Geneva Refugee Convention and must in turn be the cause of the person in question being outside their home country or the country of their previous stay. The risk of persecution must be attributable to the country of origin or the country of the last habitual residence. Imputability does not just mean causing, but also denotes responsibility in relation to the existing risk of persecution. The risk of persecution must be current, which means that it must be present at the time of the notification. Furthermore, it must relate to the entire national territory. Past acts of persecution that have already been carried out represent an essential indicator of an existing risk of persecution in the evidence procedure, whereby a prognosis must be made for this by nature. Applications for international protection must be rejected in accordance with Section 3 (3) AsylG with regard to the granting of the status of person entitled to asylum if the foreigner has an option to flee within the country (Section 11 AsylG) (section 1) or the alien has a reason for exclusion from asylum (Section 6 AsylG) has (line 2).
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